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• We present a modification to the Kiyotaki–Moore collateral constraint model.
• We allow for heterogeneity in investors ability to borrow from collateral.
• We calibrate the model to the debt-ratio distribution of US non-financial firms.
• The heterogeneous investors model leads to stronger financial amplification.
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a b s t r a c t
We introduce heterogeneity in investors’ ability to borrow fromcollateral in aKiyotaki–Moore stylemacro
model, calibrated to the quintiles of the leverage-ratio distribution of US non-financial firms. Financial
amplification intensifies, because of stronger asset price reactions of highly levered investors.
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This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
We present an extension of a core macroeconomic model with
financial frictions to account for heterogeneity in investors’ ability
to borrow from collateral. The literature leading this field, both the
seminal contributions of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke
et al. (1999), but also the large literature thereafter,2 retains a
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0/).high degree of aggregation: there typically exists a representative
financially-constrained agent, and existing models are typically
calibrated to match an economy-wide average of leverage ratios.
In the data, observed leverage ratios (assets to net worth) of US
non-financial firms are, on average, at around 1.5–2 (see, e.g.
CGFS, 2009), with wide cross-sectional variation. Leverage ratios
of financial intermediators are substantially higher.3
We take the framework of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and,
instead of a representative investor, introduce different investor
types that each can manage different types of capital, which
are collateralizable to different degrees. We calibrate the model
to match observed leverage ratios of the quintiles of the
distribution of leverage ratios for US non-financial firms, using
the dataset of Rauh and Sufi (2010). We find that the model with
heterogeneous investors produces a more pronounced financial
3 Leverage ratios of US commercial banks at the center of the crisis were in the
range of 15–20, those of US investment banks around 25–30 (CGFS, 2009).
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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collateral constraint parameters are calibrated to the economy-
wide average (homogeneous investors). This is because investors
with the highest leverage are the drivers of asset prices, not the
economy-wide average. Asset price drops in response to negative
productivity shocks are therefore stronger in the heterogeneous
investors model, tightening financial constraints of all investors,
and leading to additional amplification.
2. The model
Themodel economy is populated by a representative saver (pa-
tient), investors (impatient), and a representative firm. Investors
borrow from savers to invest in capital; they each manage a spe-
cific type of capital, which they rent to firms for use in production,
andwhich is collateralizable to different degrees. For simplicity,we
assume labor supply and investors’ types of capital in fixed supply.
2.1. Investors
There is a continuum of investors, with measure 1. Investors
come in I different types, each investor i’s size is given by ni, where
i ni = 1. Preferences of investor i, for i = 1, .., I , are:
Et
∞
s=t

β Ii
s C Iit 1−σ
1− σ , (1)
where C Iit is consumption of a homogeneous final good, σ the
coefficient of relative risk aversion and β Ii investor i’s discount
factor. The budget constraint reads:
C Iit + qi,tK Iii,t = LIiW Iit +

qi,t + RKi,t

K Iii,t−1
+ BIii,t − Ri,t−1BIii,t−1. (2)
K Iii,t is holdings of a type-i fixed asset, qi,t the asset price, RKi,t the
return the asset earns, W Iit is wage income, LIi her (inelastically
supplied) labor input, BIii,t is debt issued to savers, and Ri,t−1B
Ii
i,t−1
the payment on previously incurred debt. Investors also face a
constraint on total leverage due to an inability to commit to
repayment. Total debt of investor i is restricted to be no greater
than κi times the market value of her assets, where κi ≤ 1:
BIii,t ≤ κiqi,tK Iiit . (3)
Borrowing constraint parameters κi differ across investors, be-
cause investors hold different types of capital, which are collat-
eralizable to different degrees. In addition, lenders’ liquidation
technologies w.r.t. different investorsmay differ, because informa-
tional asymmetries may be differently strongly pronounced. The
first-order conditions of investor i’s optimal choice of asset hold-
ings, K Iii,t , and borrowing, B
Ii
i,t , are
C Iit
−σ = β IiEt C Iit+1−σ Ri,t + µIit , (4)
qi,t

C Iit
−σ = β IiEt C Iit+1−σ qi,t+1 + RKi,t+1+ µIit qi,t . (5)
Variable µIit represents the shadow value of relaxing the
leverage constraint by one unit. When µIit > 0, the expected
return on the asset exceeds the cost of borrowing, and the collateral
constraint (3) holdswith equality (resulting from the Kuhn–Tucker
condition).4
4 The assumption that investors are more impatient guarantees that investors’
leverage constraints hold with equality at the deterministic steady-state, but, be-2.2. Savers
There is a representative saver, of measure 1, with preferences:
Et
∞
s=t

βS
s CSt 1−σ
1− σ , (6)
where CSt and β
S are the saver’s consumption and discount factor,
respectively. Savers are more patient than investors, so that βS >
β Ii , ∀i. The saver maximizes (6) subject to:
CSs +

i

BSis − Ris−1BSis−1
+
i
qisK Sis
= LSW Ss +

i
qisK Sis−1 + G

K Ss−1

. (7)
K Sis denotes the saver’s holdings of type-i fixed assets, and −BSis
denotes lending to the i’th investor. The saver obtains wage W St
on her (inelastically supplied) labor. The saver uses all i-types of
fixed assets, K Sis−1, as inputs into a backyard production function,
given by Y St = G

K Ss−1
 = Z K St−1ω , with G′ K Ss−1 > 0
and G′′

K Ss−1

< 0. The saver’s aggregate fixed asset holdings
are modeled as a CES-composite of the individual i-types of fixed
assets, with substitution elasticity θ :
K St =

i
n
1
θ
i

K Si,t
 θ−1
θ
 θ
θ−1
. (8)
The saver’s first-order conditions for optimal choices of K Sis and
BSis, ∀i, are given by:
CSt
−σ = βSEt CSt+1−σ  Ri,t , (9)
qi,t

CSt
−σ = βSEt
CSt+1−σ
qi,t+1
+ωZ K St−1(ω−1) n
1
θ
i

K Si,t−1
−1
θ
K St−1
− 1
θ
 . (10)
2.3. Firms
The final good firm produces using labor and the fixed asset
with standard production function, Y It = AtLε

K It−1
ε . At is
productivity. Aggregate employment L is constant (because labor
supply is inelastic) and normalized to 1. K It−1 is a CES-composite of
the individual i-types of assets:
K It =

i
n
1
θ
i

K Iiit
 θ−1
θ
 θ
θ−1
. (11)
First-order conditions give:
Wt = (1− ε) At

K It
ε−1
, (12)
RKi,t = εAt

K It
(ε−1) n 1θi K Iit −1θ
K It
− 1
θ
. (13)
cause of precautionary motives, not generally in a stochastic world. Nevertheless,
with small shock volatility and sufficiently low investors’ discount factor, con-
straints are likely binding. Our proposed model is too stylized in some dimensions.
E.g., it is unrealistic to assume that all US non-financial firms are constrained. It
would be possible to introduce a fraction of firms that are unconstrained. Similarly,
we assume only short-term (one-period) debt, whereas in reality firms may
become constrained, because they took on long-term debt under more optimistic
lending conditions. All these are possible interesting avenues for future research.
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Parameters.
Parameter Value
Discount factor, savers βS 0.99
Discount factor, investors β Ii 0.97
Risk aversion σ 2.00
Productivity, autocor. ρA 0.9 Perri and Quadrini (1991)
Productivity, shock vol. σA 0.005 Perri and Quadrini (1991)
Formal production ϵ 0.39 Young et al. (2010)
Informal production ω 0.08 Benhabib et al. (1991)
Labor share, savers lS = LS
i L
Ii+LS 0.8
Substitution elasticity, CES θ 5
heterogen. investors
Debt ratio parameters κ1 ,κ2 ,κ3 ,κ4 ,κ5 0.84,0.61,0.48,0.34,0.10
Size of i-type capital, CES n1 ,n2 ,n3 ,n4 ,n5 0.08,0.13,0.14,0.25,0.41
homogen. investors
Debt ratio parameters κi , i = 1, . . . , 5 0.48
Size of i-type capital, CES ni 1/I = 1/5A B C
D E F
Fig. 1. Impulse responses to a 1% productivity decrease, model with homogeneous investors.2.4. Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the markets for labor, fixed assets, and debt
implies:
i
LIi + LS = L ≡ 1, (14)
K Iii,t + K Si,t = ni, i = 1, . . . , I, (15)
BIii,t + BSi,t = 0, i = 1, . . . , I. (16)
The resource constraint is:
i
C Iit + CSt = AtLε

K It−1
ε + G K St−1 . (17)
3. Parameterization
Table 1 summarizes parameter values. To save space, the table
provides references used for the specification of conventional
parameters. The substitution elasticity of the i-types of capital, θ ,
is less conventional and difficult to calibrate. We thus set θ = 1
as a baseline, but provide sensitivity analysis also for the cases of
substitutes (θ > 1) and complements (θ < 1). Z , the productivity
in the backyard production sector, is set such that investors hold
80% of fixed assets at steady-state. The main novelty of our paperis to take seriously the large heterogeneity in investors’ leverage
ratios.We consider I = 5 and calibrate parameters κi, for i = 1, ..5,
tomatch the 90, 70, 50, 30, and 10-th percentiles of the distribution
of debt ratios (measured as total debt to total assets at book value)
of US non-financial firms, using the dataset of Rauh and Sufi (2010).
This dataset contains 2453 public US non-financial firms, for the
period of 1996–2006. Each investor i’s size is calibrated to the share
of the total sales (as a proxy for value-added) of firms in quintile i in
total sales of all firms. The weights reflect the fact that firms in the
quintiles with high debt ratios are typically smaller, because small
firms typically rely more on external finance. The leverage ratios
(assets-to-net worth) corresponding to κi, for i = 1, ..5, are given
by 11−κi , which are 6.45, 2.54, 1.92, 1.51, and 1.11.
In a comparison case of homogeneous investors, we parameter-
ize debt ratios to the median, κi = 0.48 and set ni = 1/n for all i.
4. Results
We present impulse responses for two model versions: the
first is the case of ‘homogeneous investors’ (κi = 0.48, ni =
1/n, ∀i). The second is the ‘heterogeneous investors’ case, allowing
investors i = 1, . . . , I to differ in their ability to borrow from
collateral.
Fig. 1 presents impulse responses to a 1% productivity decrease
for the case of ‘homogeneous investors’. The reduced productivity
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Fig. 2. Impulse responses to a 1% productivity decrease, model with heterogeneous investors.A B
Fig. 3. Impulse responses to a 1% productivity decrease, sensitivity analysis.in formal production reduces wages for both investors and savers,
and, because the fall is persistent, reduces the return on investment
in the fixed assets for investors. These effects imply a fall in
the price of the fixed asset (panel D), which causes a tightening
of leverage constraints and leads investors to decrease their
borrowing (panel E). Panel A of Fig. 1 shows that total output,
Yt , the sum of formal and backyard production, falls. Output in
the formal sector, Y It , declines both because of the direct effect
of lower productivity, but also because in response to lower
borrowing investors can now finance less of their holdings of fixed
assets. Investors reduce their holdings of the fixed asset (panel
F), which was used in final good sector. Since more of the fixed
asset is allocated to backyard production, Y St , increases, but this
increase is not enough to compensate the fall in Y It . The binding
leverage constraint thus leads to an additional dip in output in
period 2. Because both savers and investors have temporarily
lower consumption (panel B), they reduce their savings. However,
investors reduce their demand for investment funds even more
strongly, since the tightening of leverage constraints forces them to
reduce their total borrowing to finance investment. With binding
constraints the drop in demand thus exceeds the drop in the supply
of funds, and the real interest rate must fall (panel C).
Fig. 2 presents impulse responses for the case of heterogeneous
investors. Qualitatively, the behavior of economic variables is
similar as before. But quantitatively the responses differ markedly.
Investor 1, the most levered investor, has to sharply decrease her
borrowing and, as a result, her holdings of the fixed asset, by
15.61% and 12.95% respectively. The asset price corresponding to
investor 1’s fixed assets drops by almost 3.05% at peak—because ofthe high leverage ratio this constitutes a much more pronounced
asset price drop than in the ‘homogeneous investors’ version.
Because asset prices of different types of capital are tightly linked
to each other via savers’ intertemporal optimality conditions, they
also experience pronounced declines. The (CES-based) aggregate
asset price index falls by 2.20% at peak, compared to the more
moderate drop of 2.01% in the homogeneous investors model. The
stronger asset prices declines, in turn, lead to a more substantial
tightening of financial constraints also for the other, less levered,
investors.5 This translates into an additional financial amplification
compared to the model version where investors are identical,
even though on average leverage constraints are not more severe:
output in the economy drops, at peak, by 1.33% in the model
version with investors who are heterogeneous in their ability to
borrow, compared to just 1.19% in the model with homogeneous
investors. This constitutes an additional 11.74% amplification of the
heterogeneous over the homogeneous investors model.
Fig. 3 presents sensitivity analysis of our findings, focusing on
the impulse response of total output. Panel A demonstrates that
variations in the substitution elasticity of different types of fixed
assets have little effect on the results. This is because holdings of
i-types of capital are determined mostly by the saver’s willingness
to lend to investors, which changes little with θ , since the saver
5 Even though in a very different framework, the idea that asset prices are driven
not by the average (but the marginal) investor features prominently in the work
of Geanakoplos (2009). In our setup asset prices are driven primarily by the agents
with the highest leverage.
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Panel B varies the weights of firms in quintiles i = 1, . . . , I , using
firms’ balance sheet (BS) size (total assets) for the computation
of weights,6 or using equal weights ni = 1/n. Since high-levered
investors are weighted more heavily in those alternatives, we find
higher amplification.
5. Conclusion
We presented a simple modification to a stylized Kiyotaki–
Moore style model with collateral constraints: allowing for
multiple investor types, which each has a different ability to
borrow from collateral, calibrated to match the means of the
quintiles of the distribution of leverage ratios of US non-financial
firms. We find that in such extension, the financial amplification
and acceleration mechanism is 11.74% stronger.
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